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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of preserving privacy in the online learning setting. Online learning
involves learning from the data in real-time, so that the learned model as well as its outputs are also continuously
changing. This makes preserving privacy of each data point significantly more challenging as its effect on the
learned model can be easily tracked by changes in the subsequent outputs. Furthermore, with more and more
online systems (e.g. search engines like Bing, Google etc.) trying to learn their customer’s behavior by leveraging
their access to sensitive customer data (through cookies etc), the problem of privacy preserving online learning has
become critical as well.
We study the problem in the online convex programming (OCP) framework—a popular online learning setting
with several interesting theoretical and practical implications—while using differential privacy as the formal pri-
vacy measure. For this problem, we distill two critical attributes that a private OCP algorithm should have in order
to provide reasonable privacy as well as utility guarantees: 1) linearly decreasing sensitivity, i.e., as new data points
arrive their effect on the learning model decreases, 2) sub-linear regret bound—regret bound is a popular good-
ness/utility measure of an online learning algorithm. Given an OCP algorithm that satisfies these two conditions,
we provide a general framework to convert the given algorithm into a privacy preserving OCP algorithm with good
(sub-linear) regret. We then illustrate our approach by converting two popular online learning algorithms into their
differentially private variants while guaranteeing sub-linear regret (O(√T )). Next, we consider the special case of
online linear regression problems, a practically important class of online learning problems, for which we general-
ize an approach by [13] to provide a differentially private algorithm with just O(log1.5 T ) regret. Finally, we show
that our online learning framework can be used to provide differentially private algorithms for offline learning as
well. For the offline learning problem, our approach obtains better error bounds as well as can handle larger class
of problems than the existing state-of-the-art methods [3].
1 Introduction
As computational resources are increasing rapidly, modern websites and online systems are able to process large
amounts of information gathered from their customers in real time. While typically these websites intend to learn
and improve their systems in real-time using the available data, this also represents a severe threat to the privacy of
customers.
For example, consider a generic scenario for a web search engine like Bing. Sponsored advertisements (ads) served
with search results form a major source of revenue for Bing, for which, Bing needs to serve ads that are relevant to the
user and the query. As each user is different and can have different definition of “relevance”, many websites typically
try to learn the user behavior using past searches as well as other available demographic information. This learning
problem has two key features: a) the advertisements are generated online in response to a query, b) feedback for
goodness of an ad for a user cannot be obtained until the ad is served. Hence, the problem is an online learning game
where the search engine tries to guess (from history and other available information) if a user would like an ad and
gets the cost/reward only after making that online decision; after receiving the feedback the search engine can again
update its model. This problem can be cast as a standard online learning problem and several existing algorithms can
be used to solve it reasonably well.
∗Part of the work was done while visiting Microsoft Research India.
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However, processing critical user information in real-time also poses severe threats to a user’s privacy. For ex-
ample, suppose Bing in response to certain past queries (let say about a disease), promotes a particular ad which
otherwise doesn’t appear at the top and the user clicks that ad. Then, the corresponding advertiser should be able to
guess user’s past queries, thus compromising privacy. Hence, it is critical for the search engine to use an algorithm
which not only provides correct guess about relevance of an ad to a user, but also guarantees privacy to the user. Some
of the other examples where privacy preserving online learning is critical are online portfolio management [24], online
linear prediction [20] etc.
In this paper, we address privacy concerns for online learning scenarios similar to the ones mentioned above.
Specifically, we provide a generic framework for privacy preserving online learning. We use differential privacy [11]
as the formal privacy notion, and use online convex programming (OCP) [36] as the formal online learning model.
Differential privacy is a popular privacy notion with several interesting theoretical properties. Recently, there has
been a lot of progress in differential privacy. However, most of the results assume that all of the data is available
beforehand and an algorithm processes this data to extract interesting information without compromising privacy. In
contrast, in the online setting that we consider in this paper, data arrives online1 (e.g. user queries and clicks) and the
algorithm has to provide an output (e.g. relevant ads) at each step. Hence, the number of outputs produced is roughly
same as the size of the entire dataset. Now, to guarantee differential privacy one has to analyze privacy of the complete
sequence of outputs produced, thereby making privacy preservation a significantly harder problem in this setting. In a
related work, [13] also considered the problem of differential private online learning. Using the online experts model
as the underlying online learning model, [13] provided an accurate differentially private algorithm to handle counting
type problems. However, the setting and the class of problems handled by [13] is restrictive and it is not clear how
their techniques can be extended to handle typical online learning scenarios, such as the one mentioned above. See
Section 1.1 for a more detailed comparison to [13].
Online convex programming (OCP), that we use as our underlying online learning model, is an important and
powerful online learning model with several theoretical and practical applications. OCP requires that the algorithm
selects an output at each step from a fixed convex set, for which the algorithm incurs cost according to a convex
function (that maybe different at each step). The cost function is revealed only after the point is selected. Now
the goal is to minimize the regret, i.e., total “added” loss incurred in comparison to the optimal offline solution—a
solution obtained after seeing all the cost functions. OCP encompasses various online learning paradigms and has
several applications such as portfolio management [32]. Now, assuming that each of the cost function is bounded over
the fixed convex set, regret incurred by any OCP algorithm can be trivially bounded by O(T ) where T is the total
number of time-steps for which the algorithm is executed. However, recently several interesting algorithms have been
developed that can obtain regret that is sub-linear in T . That is, as T → ∞, the total cost incurred is same as the
cost incurred by the optimal offline solution. In this paper, we use regret as a “goodness” or “utility” property of an
algorithm and require that a reasonable OCP algorithm should at least have sub-linear regret.
To recall, we consider the problem of differentially private OCP , where we want to provide differential privacy
guarantees along with sub-linear regret bound. To this end, we provide a general framework to convert any online
learning algorithm into a differentially private algorithm with sub-linear regret, provided that the algorithm satisfies
two criteria: a) linearly decreasing sensitivity (see Definition 3), b) sub-linear regret. We then analyze two popu-
lar OCP algorithms namely, Implicit Gradient Descent (IGD ) [27] and Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent
(GIGA ) [36] to guarantee differential privacy as well as O˜(√T ) regret for a fairly general class of strongly convex,
Lipschitz continuous gradient functions. In fact, we show that IGD can be used with our framework for even non-
differentiable functions.We then show that if the cost functions are quadratic functions (e.g. online linear regression),
then we can use another OCP algorithm called Follow The Leader (FTL) [20, 22] along with a generalization of a
technique by [13] to guarantee O(ln1.5 T ) regret while preserving privacy.
Furthermore, our differentially private online learning framework can be used to obtain privacy preserving algo-
rithms for a large class of offline learning problems [3] as well. In particular, we show that our private OCP framework
can be used to obtain good generalization error bounds for various offline learning problems using techniques from
[23] (see Section 4.2). Our differentially private offline learning framework can handle a larger class of learning
problems with better error bounds than the existing state-of-the-art methods [3].
1At each time step one data entry arrives.
2
1.1 Related Work
As more and more of world’s information is being digitized, privacy has become a critical issue. To this end,
several ad-hoc privacy notions have been proposed, however, most of them stand broken now. De-anonymization of
the Netflix challenge dataset by [31] and of the publicly released AOL search logs [1] are two examples that were
instrumental in discarding these ad-hoc privacy notions. Even relatively sophisticated notions such as k-anonymity
[34] and ℓ-diversity [28] have been permeated through by attacks [16]. Hence, in pursuit of a theoretically sound
notion of privacy , [11] proposed differential privacy, a cryptography inspired definition of privacy. This notion has
now been accepted as the standard privacy notion, and in this work we adhere to this notion for our privacy guarantees.
Over the years, the privacy community have developed differentially private algorithms for several interesting
problems [6, 7, 8]. In particular, there exists many results concerning privacy for learning problems [2, 3, 35, 29, 33].
Among these, [3] is of particular interest as they consider a large class of learning problems that can be written as
(offline) convex programs. Interestingly, our techniques can be used to handle the offline setting of [3] as well and in
fact, our method can handle larger class of learning problems with better error bounds (see Section 4.2).
As mentioned earlier, most of the existing work in differentially private learning has been in the offline setting
where the complete dataset is provided upfront. One notable exception is the work of [13], where authors formally
defined the notion of differentially private learning when the data arrives online. Specifically, [13] defined two notions
of differential privacy, namely user level privacy and event level privacy. Roughly speaking, user level privacy guar-
antees are at the granularity of each user whose data is present in the dataset. In contrast, event level privacy provides
guarantees at the granularity of individual records in the dataset. It has been shown in [13] that it is impossible to
obtain any non-trivial result with respect to user level privacy. In our current work we use the notion of event level pri-
vacy. [13] also looked at a particular online learning setting called the experts setting, where their algorithm achieves
a regret bound of O(ln1.5 T ) for counting problems while guaranteeing event level differential privacy. However, their
approach is restricted to experts advice setting, and cannot handle typical online learning problems that arise in prac-
tice. In contrast, we consider a significantly more practical and powerful class of online learning problems, namely,
online convex programming, and also provide a method for handling a large class of offline learning problems.
In a related line of work, there have been a few results that use online learning techniques to obtain differentially
private algorithms [18, 14]. In particular, [18] used experts framework to obtain a differentially private algorithm
for answering adaptive counting queries on a dataset. However, we stress that although these methods use online
learning techniques, however they are designed to handle the offline setting only where the dataset is fixed and known
in advance.
Recall that in the online setting, whenever a new data entry is added to D, a query has to be answered, i.e., the total
number of queries to be answer is of the order of size of the dataset. In a line of work started by [5] and subsequently
explored in details by [12, 25], it was shown that if one answers O(T ) subset sum queries on a dataset D ∈ {0, 1}T
with noise in each query smaller than
√
T , then using those answers alone one can reconstruct a large fraction of
D. That is, when the number of queries is almost same as the size of dataset, then a reasonably “large” amount of
noise needs to be added for preserving privacy. Subsequently, there has been a lot of work in providing lower bounds
(specific to differential privacy) on the amount of noise needed to guarantee privacy while answering a given number
of queries (see [19, 25, 4]). We note that our generic online learning framework (see Section 3.1) also adds noise of
the order of T 0.5+c, c > 0 at each step, thus respecting the established lower bounds. In contrast, our algorithm for
quadratic loss function (see Section 3.5) avoids this barrier by exploiting the special structure of queries that need to
be answered.
1.2 Our Contributions
Following are the main contributions of this paper:
1. We formalize the problem of privacy preserving online learning using differential privacy as the privacy no-
tion and Online Convex Programming (OCP) as the underlying online learning model. We provide a generic
differentially private framework for OCP in Section 3 and provide privacy and utility (regret) guarantees.
2. We then show that using our generic framework, two popular OCP algorithms, namely Implicit Gradient De-
scent (IGD) [27] and Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent (GIGA) [36] can be easily transformed into
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private online learning algorithms with good regret bound.
3. For a special class of OCP where cost functions are quadratic functions only, we show that we can improve
the regret bound to O(ln1.5 T ) by exploiting techniques from [13]. This special class includes a very important
online learning problem, namely, online linear regression.
4. In Section 4.2 we show that our differentially private framework for online learning can be used to solve a large
class of offline learning problems as well (where the complete dataset is available at once) and provide tighter
utility guarantees than the existing state-of-the-art results [3].
5. Finally, through empirical experiments on benchmark datasets, we demonstrate practicality of our algorithms
for practically important problems of online linear regression, as well as, online logistic regression (see Section
5).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Online Convex Programming
Online convex programming (OCP ) is one of the most popular and powerful paradigm in the online learning setting.
OCP can be thought of as a game between a player and an adversary. At each step t, player selects a point xt ∈ Rd
from a convex set C. Then, adversary selects a convex cost function ft : Rd → R and the player has to pay a cost
of ft(xt). Hence, an OCP algorithm A maps a function sequence F = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fT 〉 to a sequence of points
X = 〈x1,x2, . . . ,xT 〉 ∈ CT , i.e., A(F ) = X. Now, the goal of the player (or the algorithm) is to minimize the
total cost incurred over a fixed number (say T ) of iterations. However, as adversary selects function ft after observing
player’s move xt, it can make the total cost incurred by the player arbitrarily large. Hence, a more realistic goal for
the player is to minimize regret, i.e., the total cost incurred when compared to the optimal offline solution x∗ selected
in hindsight, i.e., when all the functions have already been provided. Formally,
Definition 1 (Regret). Let A be an online convex programming algorithm. Also, let A selects a point xt ∈ C at
t-th iteration and ft : Rd → R be a convex cost function served at t-th iteration. Then, the regret RA of A over T
iterations is given by:
RA(T ) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)− min
x∗∈C
T∑
t=1
ft(x
∗).
Assuming ft to be a bounded function over C, any trivial algorithm A that selects a random point xt ∈ C will have
O(T ) regret. However, several results [27, 36] show that if each ft is a bounded Lipschitz function over C, O(
√
T )
regret can be achieved. Furthermore, if each ft is a “strongly” convex function, O(lnT ) regret can be achieved
[27, 22].
2.2 Differential Privacy
We now formally define the notion of differential privacy in the context of our problem.
Definition 2 ((ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [11, 9]). Let F = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fT 〉 be a sequence of convex functions. Let
A(F ) = X, where X = 〈x1,x2, . . . ,xT 〉 ∈ CT be T outputs of OCP algorithm A when applied to F . Then, a
randomized OCP algorithm A is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if given any two function sequences F and F ′ that differ
in at most one function entry, for all S ⊂ CT the following holds:
Pr[A(F ) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[A(F ′) ∈ S] + δ
Intuitively, the above definition means that changing an fτ ∈ F, τ ≤ T to some other function f ′τ will not modify
the output sequence X by a large amount. If we consider each fτ to be some information associated with an individual,
then the above definition states that the presence or absence of that individual’s entry in the dataset will not affect the
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output by too much. Hence, output of the algorithm A will not reveal any extra information about the individual.
Privacy parameters (ǫ, δ) decides the extent to which an individual’s entry affects the output; lower values of ǫ and δ
means higher level of privacy. Typically, δ should be exponentially small in the problem parameters, i.e., in our case
δ ≈ exp(−T ).
2.3 Notation
F = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fT 〉 denotes the function sequence given to an OCP algorithm A and A(F ) = X s.t. X =
〈x1,x2, . . . ,xT 〉 ∈ CT represents output sequence when A is applied to F . We denote the subsequence of functions
F till the t-th step as Ft = 〈f1, . . . , ft〉. d denotes the dimensionality of the ambient space of convex set C. Vectors
are denoted by bold-face symbols, matrices are represented by capital letters. xTy denotes the inner product of x and
y. ‖M‖2 denotes spectral norm of matrix M ; recall that for symmetric matrices M , ‖M‖2 is the largest eigenvalue
of M .
Typically, α is the minimum strong convexity parameter of any ft ∈ F . Similarly, L and LG are the largest
Lipschitz constant and the Lipschitz constant of the gradient of any ft ∈ F . Recall that a function f : C → R is
α-strongly convex, if for all γ ∈ (0, 1) and for all x,y ∈ C the following holds: f(γx + (1 − γ)y) ≤ γf(x) +
(1 − γ)f(y) − α2 ||x − y||22. Also recall that a function f is L-Lipschitz, if for all x,y ∈ C the following holds:
|f(x)− f(y)| ≤ L||x− y||2. Function f is Lipschitz continuous gradient if || ▽ f(x)−▽f(y)||2 ≤ LG||x− y||2,
for all x,y ∈ C. Non-private and private versions of an OCP algorithm outputs xt+1 and xˆt+1 respectively, at time
step t. x∗ denotes the optimal offline solution, that is x∗ = argminx∈C
∑T
t=1 ft(x). RA(T ) denotes regret of an
OCP algorithm A when applied for T steps.
3 Differentially Private Online Convex Programming
In Section 2.1, we defined the online convex programming (OCP ) problem and presented a notion of utility (called
regret) for OCP algorithms. Recall that a reasonable OCP should have sub-linear regret, i.e., the regret should be
sub-linear in the number of time steps T .
In this section, we present a generic differentially private framework for solving OCP problems (see Algorithm
1). We further provide formal privacy and utility guarantees for this framework (see Theorems 1 and 2). We then use
our private OCP framework to convert two existing OCP algorithms, namely, Implicit Gradient Decent (IGD)[27]
and Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent (GIGA)[36] into differentially private algorithms using a “generic”
transformation. For both the algorithms mentioned above, we guarantee (3ǫ, 2δ)-differential privacy with sub-linear
regret.
Recall that a differentially private OCP algorithm should not produce a significantly different output for a function
sequence F ′t (with high probability) when compared to Ft, where Ft and F ′t differ in exactly one function. Hence, to
show differential privacy for an OCP algorithm, we first need to show that it is not very “sensitive” to previous cost
functions. To this end, below we formally define sensitivity of an OCP algorithm A.
Definition 3 (L2-sensitivity [11, 3]). Let F,F ′ be two function sequences differing in at most one entry, i.e., at most
one function can be different. Then, the sensitivity of an algorithm A : F → CT is the difference in the t-th output
xt+1 = A(F )t of the algorithm A, i.e.,
S(A, t) = sup
F,F ′
||A(F )t −A(F ′)t||2.
As mentioned earlier, another natural requirement for an OCP algorithm is that it should have a provably low
regret bound. There exists a variety of methods in literature which satisfy this requirement up to different degrees
depending on the class of the functions ft.
Under the above two assumptions on the OCP algorithm A, we provide a general framework for adapting the
given OCP algorithm (A) into a differentially private algorithm. Formally, the given OCP algorithm A should satisfy
the following two conditions:
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Algorithm 1 Private OCP Method (POCP)
1: Input: OCP algorithm A, cost function sequence F = 〈f1, · · · , fT 〉 and the convex set C
2: Parameter: privacy parameters (ǫ, δ)
3: Choose x1 and xˆ1 randomly from C
4: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
5: Cost: Lt(xˆt) = ft(xˆt)
6: OCP Update: xt+1 ← A(〈f1, . . . , ft〉, 〈x1, . . . ,xt〉, C)
7: Noise Addition: x˜t+1 ← xt+1 + bt+1, bt+1 ∼ N (0d, β
2
t2 I
d), where β = λAT 0.5+c
√
2
ǫ
(
ln Tδ +
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c
)
and c = ln
1
2
ln(2/δ)
2 lnT
8: Output xˆt+1 = argminx∈C
(‖x− x˜t+1‖22)
9: end for
• L2-sensitivity: The L2-sensitivity S(A, t) of the algorithm A should decay linearly with time, i.e.,
S(A, t) ≤ λA
t
, (1)
where λA > 0 is a constant depending only on A, and strong convexity, Lipschitz constant of the functions in
F .
• Regret bound RA(T ): Regret of A is assumed to be bounded, typically by a sub-linear function of T , i.e.,
RA(T ) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)− min
x∗∈C
T∑
t=1
ft(x
∗) = o(T ). (2)
Given A that satisfies both (1) and (2), we convert it into a private algorithm by perturbing xt+1 (output of A at t-th
step) by a small amount of noise, whose magnitude is dependent on the sensitivity parameter λA of A. Let x˜t+1 be
the perturbed output, which might be outside the convex set C. As our online learning game requires each output to lie
in C, we project x˜t+1 back to C and output the projection xˆt+1. Note that, our Private OCP (POCP) algorithm also
stores the “uncorrupted” iterate xt+1, as it would be used in the next step. See Algorithm 1 for a pseudo-code of our
method.
Now, using the above two assumptions along with concentration bounds for Gaussian noise vectors, we obtain
both privacy and regret bound for our Private OCP algorithm. See Section 3.1 and 3.2 for a detailed analysis of our
privacy guarantee and the regret bound.
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we use our abstract private OCP framework to convert IGD and GIGA algorithms into
private OCP methods. For both the algorithms, privacy and regret guarantees follow easily from the guarantees of our
OCP framework once the corresponding sensitivity bounds are established.
3.1 Privacy Analysis for POCP
Under the assumption (1), changing one function in the cost function sequence F can lead to a change of at most
λA/t in the t-th output of A. Hence, intuitively, adding a noise of the same order should make the t-th step output of
Algorithm 1 differentially private. We make the claim precise in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let A be an OCP algorithm that satisfies sensitivity assumption (1). Also, let c > 0 be any constant
and β = λAT 0.5+c
√
2
ǫ
(
ln Tδ +
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c
)
. Then, the t-th step output of Algorithm 1, xˆt+1, is (
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c ,
δ
T )-differentially
private.
Proof. As the output xˆt+1 is just a projection, i.e., a function (independent of the input functions F ) of x˜t+1, hence
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for x˜t+1 would imply the same for xˆt+1.
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Now by the definition of differential privacy (see Definition 2), x˜t+1 is (ǫ1, δT )-differential private, if for any
measurable set Ω ⊆ Rp:
Pr[x˜t+1 ∈ Ω] ≤ eǫ1 Pr[x˜′t+1 ∈ Ω] + δ/T,
where x˜t+1 = xt+1 + b is the output of the noise addition step (see Algorithm 1, Step 7) of our POCP algorithm,
when applied to function sequence Ft = 〈f1, . . . , ft〉. Similarly, x˜′t+1 = x′t+1 + b is the output of the noise addition
to x′t+1 which is obtained by applying update step to F ′t , where F ′t differs from Ft in exactly one function entry.
Now, x˜t+1 ∼ N (xt+1, β2t2 Id) and x˜′t+1 ∼ N (x′t+1, β
2
t2
I
d). Let ∆xt+1 = xt+1 − x′t+1. Then, we have (x˜t+1 −
xt+1)
T∆xt+1 ∼ N (0, β2t2 ‖∆xt+1‖22). Now, using assumption (1) for the OCPalgorithm A and Mill’s inequality,
Pr
[∣∣(x˜t+1 − xt+1)T∆xt+1∣∣ ≥ βλA
t2
z
]
≤ Pr
[∣∣(x˜t+1 − xt+1)T∆xt+1∣∣ ≥ β
t
‖xt+1 − x′t+1‖z
]
≤ e− z
2
2 ,
where z > 0. Setting R.H.S. ≤ δT , we have z ≥
√
2 ln Tδ .
Now, we define a “good set” G:
x ∈ G iff ∣∣(x− xt+1)T∆xt+1∣∣ ≥ βλA
t2
z. (3)
Note that,
Pr[x˜t+1 6∈ G] = Pr
[∣∣(x˜t+1 − xt+1)T∆xt+1∣∣ ≥ βλA
t2
z
]
≤ δ
T
. (4)
We now bound Pr[x˜t+1 ∈ Ω]:
Pr[x˜t+1 ∈ Ω] ≤ Pr[x˜t+1 ∈ Ω ∩ G] + Pr[x˜t+1 6∈ G] ≤ Pr[x˜t+1 ∈ Ω ∩ G] + δ
T
. (5)
As x˜t+1 ∼ N (xt+1, β2t2 Id),
Pr[x˜t+1 ∈ Ω ∩ G] =
∫
x∈Ω∩G
exp
(
−||x− xt+1||
2
2
2β
2
t2
)
dx. (6)
Now, for x ∈ Ω ∩ G:
exp
(
− t2||x−xt+1||22
2β2
)
exp
(
− t2||x−x
′
t+1||22
2β2
) = exp( t2
2β2
∆xTt+1(2x− xt+1 − x′t+1)
)
,
= exp
(
t2
2β2
(
2∆xTt+1(x− xt+1)− ‖∆xt+1‖22
))
,
≤ exp
(
t2
2β2
(
2|∆xTt+1(x− xt+1)|+ ‖∆xt+1‖22
))
,
≤ exp
(
λA
β
√
2 ln
T
δ
+
λ2A
2β2
)
,
≤ eǫ1 , (7)
where ǫ1 =
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c and β is as given in the Lemma statement. The second last inequality follows from the definition
of G and the sensitivity assumption (1).
Hence, using (5), (6), and (7), we get:
Pr[x˜t+1 ∈ Ω] ≤
∫
x∈Ω∩G
eǫ1 exp
(
− t
2||x− x′t+1||22
2β2
)
+
δ
T
≤ eǫ1 Pr[x˜′t+1 ∈ Ω] +
δ
T
. (8)
Hence, proved.
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Now, the above lemma shows (
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c ,
δ
T )-differential privacy for each step of Algorithm 1. Hence, using a simple
composition argument (see [10]) should guarantee (T 0.5−c√ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for all the steps. So to get overall
ǫ privacy, we will need c = 0.5. That is, a noise of the order O(T/t) needs to be added at each step, which intuitively
means that the noise added is larger than the effect of incoming function ft and hence can lead to an arbitrarily bad
regret.
To avoid this problem, we need to exploit the interdependence between the iterates (and outputs) of our algorithm
so as to obtain a better bound than the one obtained by using the union bound. For this purpose, we use the following
lemma by [14] that bounds the relative entropy of two random variables in terms of the L∞ norm of their probability
density ratio and also a proof technique developed by [18, 17] for the problem of releasing differentially private
datasets.
Lemma 2 ([14]). Suppose two random variables Y and Z satisfy,
D∞(Y ||Z) = max
w∈supp(Y )
ln
(
pdf[Y = w]
pdf[Z = w]
)
≤ ǫ, D∞(Z||Y ) ≤ ǫ.
Then D(Y ||Z) = ∫w∈supp(Y ) pdf[Y = w] ln (pdf[Y=w]pdf[Z=w]) ≤ 2ǫ2. supp(Y ) is the support set of a random variable Y .
We now state a technical lemma which will be useful for our differential privacy proof.
Lemma 3. Assuming that at each stage t, Algorithm 1 preserves
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c
-differential privacy,
Ex˜t+1
[
ln
(
pdf[x˜t+1]
pdf[x˜′t+1 = x˜t+1]
)]
≤ 2ǫ
T 1+2c
,
where x˜t+1 and x˜′t+1 are output of the t-th iteration of the Noise Addition Step of our POCP algorithm (Algorithm 1),
when applied to function sequences Ft and F ′t differing in exactly one function entry.
Proof. Using the fact that x˜t+1 is
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c
-differential private:
∀x, −
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c
≤ ln
(
pdf[x˜t+1 = x]
pdf[x˜′t+1 = x]
)
≤
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c
.
Lemma now follows using the above observation with Lemma 2.
Now we state the privacy guarantee for Algorithm 1 over all T iterations.
Theorem 1 (POCP Privacy). LetA be an OCP algorithm that satisfies the sensitivity assumption (1), then the POCP
algorithm (see Algorithm 1) is (3ǫ, 2δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Following the notation from the proof of Lemma 1, let G be defined by (3). Now, using (4), for each round,
Pr[x˜t+1 6∈ G] ≤ δ
T
. (9)
Now, the probability that the noise vectors bt+1 = x˜t+1 − xt+1 = x˜′t+1 − x′t+1, 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 are all from the
“good” set G in all the T rounds is at least 1− T · δT = 1− δ.
We now condition the remaining proof on the event that the noise vector bt+1 in each round is such that x˜t+1 ∈ G.
Let L(x˜1, · · · , x˜T ) =
∑T
t=1 ln
(
pdf[x˜t]
pdf[x˜′t=x˜t]
)
. Using Lemma 3,
Ex˜1,··· ,x˜T [L(x˜1, · · · , x˜T )] =
T∑
t=1
Ex˜t
[
ln
(
pdf[x˜t]
pdf[x˜′t = x˜t]
)]
≤ 2Tǫ
T 1+2c
≤ 2ǫ
T 2c
≤ 2ǫ.
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Let Zt = ln
(
pdf[x˜t]
pdf[x˜′t=x˜t]
)
. Since each bt is sampled independently and the randomness in Zt is only due to bt,
Zt’s are independent. We have L(x˜1, · · · , x˜T ) =
∑T
t=1 Zt, where |Zt| ≤
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c . By Azuma-Hoeffding’s inequality,
Pr[L(x˜1, · · · , x˜T ) ≥ 2ǫ+ ǫ] ≤ 2 exp
( −2ǫ2
T × ǫT 1+2c
)
≤ 2 exp (−2T 2c) .
Setting δ = 2exp
(−2T 2c), we get c = (ln( 12 ln 2δ )2 lnT . Hence, with probability at least 1− δ, 3ǫ-differential privacy holds
conditioned on x˜t ∈ G, i.e,
∀z1, . . . ,zT ∈ Rd, ΠTt=1 pdf(x˜t = zt) ≤ e3ǫΠTt=1 pdf(x˜′t = zt).
Also, recall that with probability at least 1 − δ, the noise vector bt in each round itself was such that x˜t ∈ G. Hence,
with probability at least 1−2δ, 3ǫ-differential privacy holds. (3ǫ, 2δ)-differential privacy now follows using a standard
argument similar to (5).
3.2 Utility (Regret) Analysis for POCP
In this section, we provide a generic regret bound analysis for our POCP algorithm (see Algorithm 1). The regret
bound of POCP depends on the regret RA(T ) of the non-private OCP algorithm A. For typical OCP algorithms like
IGD, GIGA and FTL , RA(T ) = O(log T ), assuming each cost function ft is strongly convex.
Theorem 2 (POCP Regret). Let L > 0 be the maximum Lipschitz constant of any function ft in the sequence F ,
RA(T ), the regret of the non-private OCP algorithm A over T -time steps and λA, the sensitivity parameter ofA (see
(1)). Then the expected regret of our POCP algorithm (Algorithm 1) satisfies:
E
[
T∑
t=1
ft(xˆt)
]
−min
x∈C
T∑
t=1
ft(x) ≤ 2
√
dL(λA + ‖C‖2)
√
T
ln2 Tδ√
ǫ
+RA(T ),
where d is the dimensionality of the output space, and ‖C‖2 is the diameter of the convex set C. In other words, the
regret bound is RA(T ) + O˜
(√
dT
)
.
Proof. Let xˆ1, · · · , xˆT be the output of the POCP algorithm. By the Lipschitz continuity of the cost functions ft we
have,
T∑
t=1
ft(xˆt)−min
x∈C
T∑
t=1
ft(x) ≤
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)−min
x∈C
T∑
t=1
ft(x) + L
T∑
t=1
||xˆt − xt||2 ≤ RA(T ) + L
T∑
t=1
||xˆt − xt||2. (10)
Since at any time t ≥ 1, xˆt is the projection of x˜t on the convex set C, we have
||xt+1 − xˆt+1||2 ≤ ||xt+1 − x˜t+1||2 = ||bt+1||2, ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
where bt+1 is the noise vector added in the t-th iteration of the POCP algorithm. Therefore,
L
T∑
t=1
||xt − xˆt||2 ≤ L
(
‖C‖2 +
T−1∑
t=1
||bt+1||2
)
. (11)
Now, bt+1 ∼ N (0d, β2t2 Id) where
β = λAT 0.5+c
√
2
ǫ
(
ln
T
δ
+
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c
)
.
Therefore, ||bt+1||2 follows Chi-distribution with parameters µ =
√
2β
t
Γ((d+1)/2)
Γ(d/2) and σ
2 = β
2
t2 (d− µ2).
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Using c = ln (
1
2
ln 2
δ
)
2 lnT ,
E[
T−1∑
t=1
||bt+1||2] ≤
√
2βΓ((d+ 1)/2)
Γ(d/2)
∫ T−1
1
1
t
dt,
≤ Γ((d+ 1)/2)
Γ(d/2)
λA
√
T lnT
√√√√√2
ǫ
ln
2
δ

ln T
δ
+
√
ǫ√
T
2 ln
2
δ

,
≤ 2
√
dλA
√
T
ln2 Tδ√
ǫ
. (12)
The theorem now follows by combining (10), (11), (12).
Using Chebyshev’s inequality, we can also obtain a high probability bound on the regret.
Corollary 1. Let L > 0 be the maximum Lipschitz constant of any function ft in the sequence F , RA(T ) , the regret
of the non-private OCP algorithm A over T -time steps and λA, the sensitivity parameter of A (see (1)). Then with
probability at least 1− γ,the regret of our Private OCP algorithm (Algorithm 1) satisfies:
T∑
t=1
ft(xˆt)−min
x∈C
T∑
t=1
ft(x) ≤ 2
√
dL(λA + ‖C‖2)
√
T
ln2 Tδ√
ǫγ
+RA(T ),
where d is the dimensionality of the output space, ‖C‖2 is the diameter of C.
3.3 Implicit Gradient Descent Algorithm
In this section, we consider the Implicit Gradient Descent (IGD) algorithm [27], a popular online convex programming
algorithm, and present a differentially private version of the same using our generic framework (see Algorithm 1).
Before deriving its privacy preserving version, we first briefly describe the IGD algorithm [27].
At each step t, IGD incurs loss ft(xt). Now, given ft, IGD finds the t-th step output xt+1 so that it not “far” away
from the current solution xt but at the same time tries to minimize the cost ft(xt+1). Formally,
IGD : xt+1 ← argmin
x∈C
1
2
||x− xt||22 + ηtft(x), (13)
where squared Euclidean distance is used as the notion of distance from the current iterate. [27] describe a much large
class of distance functions that can be used, but for simplicity of exposition we consider the Euclidean distance only.
Assuming each ft(x) is a strongly convex function, a simple modification of the proof by [27] shows O(log T ) regret
for IGD, i.e. RIGD(T ) = O(log T ).
Recall that our generic private OCP framework can be used to convert any OCP algorithm as long as it satisfies
low-sensitivity and low-regret assumptions (see (1), (2)). Now, similar to POCP , our Private IGD (PIGD) algorithm
also adds an appropriately calibrated noise at each update step to obtain differentially private outputs ˆxt+1. See
Algorithm 2 for a pseudo-code of our algorithm.
As stated above, RIGD(T ) = O(log T ) if each ft(x) is strongly convex. We now bound sensitivity of IGD at each
step in the following lemma. The proof makes use of a simple and novel induction based technique.
Lemma 4 (IGD Sensitivity). L2-sensitivity (see Definition 3) of the IGD algorithm is 2Lt for the t-th iterate, where L
is the maximum Lipschitz constant of any function fτ , 1 ≤ τ ≤ t.
Proof. We prove the above lemma using mathematical induction.
Base Case (t = 1): As x1 is selected randomly, it’s value doesn’t depend on the underlying dataset.
Induction Step t = τ + 1: As fτ is α strongly convex, the strong convexity coefficient of the function f˜τ (x) =
10
Algorithm 2 Private Implicit Gradient Descent (PIGD)
1: Input: Cost function sequence F = 〈f1, · · · , fT 〉 and the convex set C
2: Parameter: privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), maximum Lipschitz constant L and minimum strong convexity parameter
α of any function in F
3: Choose x1 and xˆ1 randomly from C
4: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
5: Cost: Lt(xˆt) = ft(xˆt)
6: Learning rate: ηt = 1αt
7: IGD Update: xt+1 ← argminx∈C
(
1
2‖x− xt‖22 + ηtft(x)
)
8: Noise Addition: x˜t+1 ← xt+1 + bt+1, bt+1 ∼ N (0d, β
2
t2 I
d), where β = 2LT 0.5+c
√
2
ǫ
(
ln Tδ +
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c
)
and
c =
ln 1
2
ln(2/δ)
2 lnT
9: Output xˆt+1 = argminx∈C
(‖x− x˜t+1‖22)
10: end for
1
2‖x−xτ‖22+ητfτ (x) is τ+1τ . Now using strong convexity and the fact that at optima xτ+1, 〈▽f˜τ (xτ+1),x−xτ+1〉 ≥
0,∀x ∈ C, we get:
f˜τ (x
′
τ+1) ≥ f˜τ (xτ+1) +
τ + 1
2τ
‖xτ+1 − x′τ+1‖22. (14)
Now, we consider two cases:
• F − F ′ = {fτ}: Define f˜ ′τ (x) = 12‖x − xτ‖2 + ητf ′τ (x) and let x′τ+1 = argminx∈C f˜ ′τ (x). Then, similar to
(14), we get:
f˜ ′τ (xτ+1) ≥ f˜ ′τ (x′τ+1) +
τ + 1
2τ
‖xτ+1 − x′τ+1‖22. (15)
Adding (14) and (15), we get:
‖xτ+1 − x′τ+1‖22 ≤
1
τ + 1
|fτ (x′τ+1) + f ′τ (xτ+1)− fτ (xτ+1)− f ′τ (x′τ+1)| ≤
2L
τ + 1
‖xτ+1 − x′τ+1‖2.
Lemma now follows using simplification.
• F − F ′ = {fi}, i < τ : Define f˜ ′τ (x) = 12‖x − x′τ‖2 + ητfτ (x) and let x′τ+1 = argminx∈C f˜ ′τ (x). Then,
similar to (14), we get:
f˜ ′τ (xτ+1) ≥ f˜ ′τ (x′τ+1) +
τ + 1
2τ
‖xτ+1 − x′τ+1‖22. (16)
Adding (14) and (16), we get:
‖xτ+1 − x′τ+1‖22 ≤
τ
τ + 1
|(xτ+1 − x′τ+1) · (xτ − x′τ )| ≤
τ
τ + 1
‖xτ+1 − x′τ+1‖2‖xτ − x′τ‖2.
Lemma now follows after simplification and using the induction hypothesis.
Using the above lemma and Theorem 1, privacy guarantee for PIGD follows directly.
Theorem 3 (PIGD Privacy). PIGD (see Algorithm 2) is (3ǫ, 2δ)-differentially private.
Next, the utility (regret) analysis of our PIGD algorithm follows directly using Theorem 2 along with regret bound
of IGD algorithm, RIGD(T ) = O(L2α log T + ||C||2). Regret bound provided below scales roughly as O˜(
√
T ).
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Algorithm 3 Private GIGA (PGIGA)
1: Input: Cost function sequence F = 〈f1, · · · , fT 〉 and the convex set C
2: Parameter: Privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), Lipschitz continuity (L) and strong convexity (α) bound on the function
sequence F , tq = 2L2G/α2
3: Choose x1, . . . ,xtq−1 and xˆ1, . . . , xˆtq−1 randomly from C, incurring a cost of
∑tq−1
t=1 ft(xˆt)
4: for t = tq to T − 1 do
5: Cost: Lt(xˆt) = ft(xˆt)
6: Step Size: ηt = 2αt
7: GIGA Update: xt+1 ← argminx∈C
(‖xt − ηt ▽ ft(xt)‖22)
8: Noise Addition: x˜t+1 ← xt+1 + bt+1, bt+1 ∼ N (0d, β
2
t2
I
d), where β = 2GT 0.5+c
√
2
ǫ
(
ln Tδ +
√
ǫ
T 0.5+c
)
where c = ln
1
2
ln(2/δ)
2 lnT
9: Output xˆt+1 = argminx∈C
(‖x− x˜t+1‖22)
10: end for
Theorem 4 (PIGD Regret). Let L be the maximum Lipschitz constant and let α be the minimum strong convexity
parameter of any function ft in the function sequence F . Then the expected regret of the private IGD algorithm over
T -time steps is O˜(
√
T ). Specifically,
E[
T∑
t=1
ft(xˆt)]−min
x∈C
T∑
t=1
ft(x)) ≤ C
(
(L2/α + ‖C‖2)
√
d ln1.5 Tδ√
ǫ
√
T
)
,
where C > 0 is a constant and d is the dimensionality of the output space.
3.4 Private GIGA Algorithm
In this section, we apply our general differential privacy framework to the Generalized Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent
(GIGA) algorithm [36], which is one of the most popular algorithms for OCP. GIGA is a simple extension of the
classical projected gradient method to the OCP problem. Specifically, the iterates xt+1 are obtained by a projection
onto the convex set C, of the output of the gradient descent step xt − ηt ▽ ft(xt) where ηt = 1/αt, and α is the
minimum strong convexity parameter of any function ft in F .
For the rest of this section, we assume that each of the function ft in the input function sequence F are differen-
tiable, Lipschitz continuous gradient and strongly convex. Note that this is a stricter requirement than our private IGD
algorithm where we require only the Lipschitz continuity of ft.
Proceeding as in the previous section, we obtain a privacy preserving version of the GIGA algorithm using our
generic POCP framework (See Algorithm 1). Algorithm 3 details the steps involved in our Private GIGA (PGIGA)
algorithm. Note that PGIGA has an additional step (Step 3) compared to POCP (Algorithm 1). This step is required
to prove the sensitivity bound in Lemma 5 given below.
Furthermore, we provide the privacy and regret guarantees for our PGIGA algorithm using Theorem 1 and Theo-
rem 2. To this end, we first show that GIGA satisfies the sensitivity assumption mentioned in (1).
Lemma 5 (GIGA Sensitivity). Let α > 0 be the minimum strong convexity parameter of any function ft in the
function sequence F . Also, let LG be the maximum Lipschitz continuity parameter of the gradient of any function
ft ∈ F and let G = maxτ ‖ ▽ ft(x)‖2,∀x ∈ C. Then, L2-sensitivity (see Definition 3) of the GIGA algorithm is 2Gαt
for the t-th iterate, where 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. Let xt+1 and x˜′t+1 be the t-th iterates when GIGA is applied to F and F ′, respectively. Using this notation, to
prove the L2 sensitivity of GIGA, we need to show that:
‖xt+1 − x′t+1‖ ≤
2G
αt
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We prove the above inequality using mathematical induction.
Base Case (1 ≤ t ≤ tq = 2L2G/α2 + 1): As x1, . . . ,xtq are selected randomly, their value doesn’t depend on the
underlying dataset. Hence, xt = x′t,∀1 ≤ t ≤ tq.
Induction Step t = τ > 2L2G/α2 + 1: We consider two cases:
• F − F ′ = {fτ}: Since the difference between F and F ′ is only the τ -th function, hence xτ = x′τ . As C is a
convex set, projection onto C always decreases distance, hence:
‖xτ+1 − x′τ+1‖2 ≤ ‖(xτ − ητ ▽ fτ (xτ ))− (xτ − ητ ▽ f ′τ (xτ ))‖2,
= ητ‖ ▽ fτ (xτ )−▽f ′τ (xτ )‖2,
≤ 2G
ατ
.
Hence, lemma holds in this case.
• F − F ′ = {fi}, i < τ : Again using convexity of C, we get:
‖xτ+1 − x′τ+1‖22 ≤ ‖(xτ − ητ ▽ fτ (xτ ))− (x′τ − ητ ▽ fτ (x′τ ))‖22,
= ‖xτ − x′τ‖22 + η2τ‖ ▽ fτ (xτ )−▽fτ (x′τ )‖22 − 2ητ (xτ − x′τ )T (▽fτ (xτ )−▽fτ (x′τ )),
≤ (1 + η2τL2G)‖xτ − x′τ‖22 − 2ητ (xτ − x′τ )T (▽fτ (xτ )−▽fτ (x′τ )), (17)
where the last equation follows using Lipschitz continuity of ▽ft. Now, using strong convexity:
(xτ − x′τ )T (▽fτ (xτ )−▽fτ (x′τ )) ≥ α‖xτ − x′τ‖22.
Combining the above observation and the induction hypothesis with (17):
‖xτ+1 − x′τ+1‖22 ≤
(
1 + L2Gη
2
τ − 2αητ
) · 4G2
(τ − 1)2 . (18)
Lemma now follows by setting ητ = 2ατ and τ >
2L2G
α2 .
Using the lemma above with the privacy analysis of POCP (Theorem 1), the privacy guarantee for PGIGAfollows
immediately.
Theorem 5 (PGIGA Privacy). PGIGA (see Algorithm 3) is (3ǫ, 2δ)-differentially private.
Next, using the regret bound analysis for GIGA from [20](Theorem 1) along with Theorem 2, we get the following
utility (regret bound) analysis for our PGIGA algorithm. Here again, ignoring constants, the regret simplifies to
O˜(
√
dT ).
Theorem 6 (PGIGA Regret). Let α > 0 be the minimum strong convexity parameter of any function ft in the function
sequence F . Also, let LG be the maximum Lipschitz continuity parameter of the gradient of any function ft ∈ F and
let G = maxτ ‖ ▽ ft(x)‖2,∀x ∈ C. Then, the expected regret of PGIGA satisfies
E[RPGIGA(T )] ≤
4
√
d(G/α + ‖C‖2)G ln2 Tδ√
ǫ
√
T +
2G2
α
(1 + log T ) +
2L2GG||C||2
α2
where ||C||2 is the diameter of the convex set C and d is the dimensionality of the output space.
Proof. Observe that for the first tq = 2L
2
G
α2
iterations PGIGA outputs random samples from C. The additional regret
incurred during this time is bounded by a constant (w.r.t. T) that appears as the last term in the regret bound given
above. For iterations t ≥ tq, the proof follows directly by using Theorem 2 and regret bound of GIGA. Note that
we use a slightly modified step-size ηt = 2/αt, instead of the standard ηt = 1/αt. This difference in the step size
increases the regret of GIGA as given by [20] by a factor of 2.
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In Section 3.3 as well this section, we provided examples of the conversion of two standard online learning
algorithms into privacy preserving algorithms with provably bounded regret. In both these examples, we show low-
sensitivity of the corresponding learning algorithms and use our analysis of POCP to obtain privacy and utility
bounds. Similarly, we can obtain privacy preserving variants of many other OCP algorithms such as Follow The
Leader (FTL), Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) etc. Our low-sensitivity proofs should be of independent
interest to the online learning community as well, as they point to a connection between stability (sensitivity) and
low-regret (online learnability)—an open problem in the learning community.
3.5 Logarithmic regret for Quadratic Cost Functions
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we described two differentially private algorithms with O˜(
√
T ) regret for any strongly convex
Lipschitz continuous cost functions. In this section we show that by restricting the cost functions to a practically
important class of quadratic functions, we can design a differentially private algorithm to achieve logarithmic regret.
For simplicity of exposition, we consider cost functions of the form:
ft(x) =
1
2
(yt − vTt x)2 +
α
2
‖x‖2, (19)
for some α > 0. For such cost functions we show that we can achieve O(poly(log T )) regret while providing (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy.
Our algorithm at a high level is a modified version of the Follow the Leader (FTL) algorithm [20]. The FTL
algorithm obtains the t-th step output as:
FTL : xt+1 = argmin
x∈C
t∑
τ=1
fτ (x). (20)
For our quadratic cost function (19) with C = Rd, the above update yields
QFTL : xt+1 = (tαI+ Vt)
−1(ut), (21)
where Vt = Vt−1 + vtvTt and ut = ut−1 + ytvt with V0 = 0 and u0 = 0. Using elementary linear algebra and
assuming |yt| ≤ R and ‖vt‖2 ≤ R, we can show that ‖xt+1‖2 ≤ 2R/α,∀t. Now, using Theorem 2 of [22] along
with our bound on ‖xt‖2, we obtain the following regret bound for the quadratic loss functions based FTL (QFTL)
algorithm:
RQFTL(T ) ≤ R
4(1 + 2R/α)2
α
log T. (22)
Furthermore, we can show that the QFTL algorithm (see Equation 21) also satisfies Assumption 1. Hence, similar to
Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we can obtain a differentially private variant of QFTL with O˜(
√
T ) regret. However, we show
that using the special structure of QFTL updates (see (21)), we can obtain a differentially private variant of QFTL
with just O(poly(log T )) regret, a significant improvement over O˜(√T ) regret.
The key observation behind our method is that each QFTL update is dependent on the function sequence F through
Vt and ut only. Hence, computing Vt and ut in a differentially private manner would imply differential privacy for
our QFTL updates as well. Furthermore, each Vt and ut themselves are obtained by simply adding an “update” to
the output at step t − 1. This special structure of Vt and ut facilitates usage of a generalization of the “tree-based”
technique for computing privacy preserving partial sums proposed by [13]. Note that the “tree-based” technique to
compute sums (see Algorithm 5) adds significantly lower amount of noise at each step than that is added by our
POCP algorithm (see Algorithm 1). Hence, leading to significantly better regret. Algorithm 4 provides a pseudo-
code of our PQFTL method. At each step t, Vˆt and uˆt are computed by perturbing Vt and ut (to preserve privacy)
using PrivateSum algorithm (see Algorithm 5). Next, Vˆt and uˆt are used in the QFTL update (see (21)) to obtain the
next iterate xˆt+1.
Now, we provide both privacy as well as utility (regret bound) guarantees for our PQFTL algorithm. First, we
prove the privacy of the PQFTL algorithm (Algorithm 4).
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Algorithm 4 Private Follow the Leader for Quadratic Cost (PQFTL)
1: Input: cost function sequence F = 〈f1, · · · , fT 〉, where each ft(x; yt,vt) = (yt − vTt x)2 + α2 ||x||22
2: Parameter: privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), R = max(maxt ||vt||2,maxt |yt|)
3: Initialize xˆ1 = 0d
4: Initialize empty binary trees BV and Bu, a data structure to compute Vˆt and uˆt—differentially private versions
of Vt and ut
5: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
6: Cost: Lt(xˆt) = ft(xˆt) = (yt − vTt xˆt)2 + α2 ||xˆt||22
7: (Vˆt, BV )← PrivateSum(vtvTt , BV , t, R2, ǫ2 , δ2 , T ) (see Algorithm 5)
8: (uˆt, Bu)← PrivateSum(ytvt, Bu, t, R, ǫ2 , δ2 , T ) (see Algorithm 5)
9: QFTL Update: xˆt+1 ← (tαI+ Vˆt)−1(uˆt)
10: Output xˆt+1
11: end for
Theorem 7 (PQFTL Privacy). Let F be a sequence of quadratic functions, where ft(x; yt,vt) = 12 (yt − vTt x)2 +
α
2 ||x||22. Then, PQFTL (Algorithm 4) is (ǫ, δ) differential private.
Proof. Using Theorem 9 (stated in Section 3.5.1), both Vˆt and uˆt are each ( ǫ2 , δ2 )-differentially private w.r.t. vt and
yt, ∀t and hence w.r.t. the function sequence F. Now, xˆt+1 depends on F only through [Vˆt, uˆt]. Hence, the theorem
follows using a standard composition argument [11, 10].
Next, we provide regret bound analysis for our PQFTL algorithm.
Theorem 8 (PQFTL Regret). Let F be a sequence of quadratic functions, where ft(x; yt,vt) = 12(yt − vTt x)2 +
α
2 ||x||22. Let R be the maximum L2 norm of any vt and |yt|. Then, the regret bound of PQFTL (Algorithm 4) satisfies
(w.p. ≥ 1− exp(−d/2)):
RPQFTL(T ) = O˜
(
R6 log 1δ√
ǫα3
√
d log1.5 T
)
.
Proof. Using definition of regret,
RPQFTL =
T∑
t=1
ft(xˆt)− argmin
x∗
T∑
t=1
ft(x
∗) =
T∑
t=1
ft(xt)− argmin
x∗
T∑
t=1
ft(x
∗) +
T∑
t=1
(ft(xˆt)− ft(xt)),
≤ RQFTL(T ) +
T∑
t=1
(ft(xˆt)− ft(xt)),
≤ R
4(1 + 2R/α)2
α
log T +
T∑
t=1
(ft(xˆt)− ft(xt)), (23)
where last inequality follows using (22).
Now, as ft(x) is a (R+ α)-Lipschitz continuous gradient function,
ft(xˆt)− ft(xt) ≤ ((vTt xt − yt)vt + αxt)T (xˆt − xt) +
R+ α
2
‖xˆt − xt‖2,
≤ R(2R2/α+R+ 2)‖xˆt − xt‖+ R+ α
2
‖xˆt − xt‖2, (24)
where last inequality follows using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the fact that ‖xt‖2 ≤ 2R/α.
We now bound ||xˆt+1 − xt+1||2. Let Vˆt = Vt + At and uˆt = ut + βt where At and βt are the noise additions
introduced by the Private Sum algorithm (Algorithm 5).
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Now, from the step 9 of PQFTL (Algorithm 4) we have,
(Vˆt + tαI)xˆt+1 = uˆt ⇔ (1
t
Vˆt + αI)xˆt+1 =
1
t
uˆt. (25)
Similarly, using QFTL update (see (21)) we have,
(
1
t
Vt + αI)xt+1 =
1
t
ut. (26)
Using (25) and (26):
(
1
t
Vˆt + αI)(xˆt+1 − xt+1) = 1
t
βt − 1
t
Atxt+1. (27)
Now, using Vˆt = Vt +At and the triangle inequality we have,
||(1
t
Vˆt + αI)(xˆt+1 − xt+1)||2 ≥ ||(1
t
Vt + αI)(xˆt+1 − xt+1)||2 − ||1
t
At(xˆt+1 − xt+1)||2 (28)
Furthermore,
||1
t
At(xˆt+1 − xt+1)||2 ≤ 1
t
||At||2||xˆt+1 − xt+1||2 (29)
Thus by combining (27), (28), (29) and using the fact that the smallest eigenvalue of (1tVt + αI) is lower-bounded by
α,
1
t
||βt||2 + 1
t
‖At‖2‖xt+1‖2 ≥ |α− ||At||2
t
|||xˆt+1 − xt+1||2 (30)
Now using Theorem 9 each entry of the matrixAt is drawn fromN (0, σ2 log T ) for σ2 = R2ǫ log2 T log log Tδ . Thus the
spectral norm of At, ||At||2 is bounded by 3σ
√
d with probability at least 1− exp(−d/2). Similarly, ||βt||2 ≤ 3σ
√
d,
with probability at least 1− exp(−d/2). Also, ||xt||2 ≤ 2R/α. Using the above observation with (30),
||xˆt+1 − xt+1||2 ≤ σ
√
d
t
· 3 + 6R/α
|α− 6σ
√
dR
αt |
. (31)
Using (23), (24), and (31), we get (with probability at least 1− exp(−d/2)):
RPQFTL(T ) ≤ R
4(1 + 2R/α)2
α
log T+3
√
dR(2R2/α+R+2)(1+2R/α)(1+log T )
1√
ǫ
√
log T log
√
logT
δ
. (32)
Hence w.h.p.,
RPQFTL(T ) = O˜
(
R6 log 1δ√
ǫα3
√
d log1.5 T
)
.
3.5.1 Computing Partial Sums Privately
In this section, we consider the problem of computing partial sums while preserving differential privacy. Formally, let
D = 〈w1,w2, · · · ,wT 〉 be a sequence of vectors, where at each time step t, a vector wt ∈ Rd is provided. Now the
goal is to output partial sums Wt =
∑t
τ=1wτ at each time step t, without compromising privacy of the data vectors
in D. Note that by treating a matrix as a long vector obtained by row concatenation, we can use the same approach to
compute partial sums over matrices as well.
Now, note that L2-sensitivity of each partial sum is O(R) (R = maxt ‖wt‖2), as changing one wτ can change a
partial sum by an additive factor of 2R. Hence, a naı¨ve method is to add O(R
√
log 1
δ
ǫ ) noise at t-th to obtain (ǫ, δ)-
privacy for a fixed step t. Using standard composition argument, overall privacy of such a scheme over T iterations
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Binary Tree for T = 8. Each node in the tree has noise drawn from N (0, σ2Id) including the leaves. The
edge labels on the path from root to any node form the label for that node. (a): w1,w2, ..,w7 are the input vectors
that have arrived till time step t = 7. Each internal node is obtained by adding noise from N (0, σ2Id) to the sum of
input vectors in the sub-tree rooted at the node. To return the partial sum at t = 7, return the sum of the nodes in thick
red. The dotted nodes are unpopulated. (b): The figure depicts the change in the data structure after the arrival of w8.
Now the partial sum at t = 8 is obtained by using just one node denoted in thick red.
would be (Tǫ, T δ). Hence, to get a constant (ǫ′, δ′) privacy, we would need to add O(R
√
T
√
log T
δ′
ǫ′ ) noise. In contrast,
our method, which is based on a generalization of [13], is able to provide the same level of privacy by adding only
O(R log T
√
log log T
δ′
ǫ′ ) noise. We first provide a high level description of the algorithm and then provide a detailed
privacy and utility analysis.
Following [13], we first create a binary tree B where each leaf node corresponds to an input vector in D. We
denote a node at level i (root being at level 0) with strings in {0, 1}i in the following way: For a given node in level i
with label s ∈ {0, 1}i, the left child of s is denoted with the label s ◦ 0 and the right child is denoted with s ◦ 1. Here
the operator ◦ denotes concatenation of strings. Also, the root is labeled with the empty string .
Now, each node s in the tree B contains two values: Bs and Bˆs, where Bs is obtained by the summation of
vectors in each of the leaves of the sub-tree rooted at s, i.e., Bs =
∑
j:j=s◦r
r∈{0,1}k−i
wj . Also, Bˆs = Bs + bs is a
perturbation of Bs, bs ∼ N (0, σ2Id), and σ is as given in Lemma 6.
A node in the tree is populated only when all the vectors that form the leaves of the sub-tree rooted at the node
have arrived. Hence, at time instant t we receive vector wt and populate the nodes in the tree B for which all the
leaves in the sub-tree rooted at them have arrived. To populate a node labeled s, we compute Bs = Bs◦0 +Bs◦1, the
sum of the corresponding values at its two children in the tree and also Bˆs = Bs + bs, bs ∼ N (0, σ2Id).
As we prove below in Lemma 6, for a i-th level node which is populated and has label s ∈ {0, 1}i , Bˆs contains
an (ǫ, δ)-private sum of the 2k−i vectors that correspond to the leaves of the sub-tree rooted at s. Now, to output a
differentially private partial sum at time step t, we add up the perturbed values at the highest possible nodes that can
be used to compute the sum. Note, that such a summation would have at most one node at each level. See Figure 1
for an illustration. We provide a pseudo-code of our method in Algorithm 5.
Theorem 9 states privacy as well as utility guarantees of our partial sums method (Algorithm 5). We first provide
a technical lemma which we later use in our proof of Theorem 9.
Let Bˆ(D) denote the set of all perturbed node values Bˆs,∀s obtained by applying Algorithm 5 on dataset D.
Also, D and D′ be two datasets that differ in at most one entry, say wt.
Lemma 6. Let Bˆs(D) = Bs(D) + bs, where bs ∼ N (0, σ2Id) for σ2 = R2ǫ log2 T log log Tδ . Then, for any t and any
Θs ∈ Rd,
pdf[Bˆs(D) = Θs] ≤ e
ǫ
logT pdf[Bˆs(D
′) = Θs] +
δ
log T
where D and D′ are two datasets differing in exactly one entry.
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Algorithm 5 Private Sum(wt,B, t, R, ǫ, δ, T )
Require: Data vector wt, current binary tree B, current vector number t, R a bound on ||wt||2, privacy parameters ǫ
and δ, total number of vectors T , dimensionality of vectors d
1: if t = 1 then
2: Initialize the binary tree B over T leaves with all nodes
3: σ2 ← R2ǫ log2 T log log Tδ
4: end if
5: st ← the string representation of t in binary
6: Bst ← wt //Populate the st-th entry of B
7: Bˆst ← Bst + bst , where bst ∼ N (0, σ2Id)
8: Let St is the set of all ancestors s of st in the tree B, such that all the leaves in the sub-tree rooted at s are already
populated
9: for all s ∈ St do
10: Bs ← Bs◦0 +Bs◦1 // Bs is the value at node with label s (without noise)
11: Bˆs ← Bs + bs, where bs ∼ N (0, σ2Id) // Bˆs is the noisy value at node with label s
12: end for
13: Find the minimum set of already populated nodes in B that can compute
∑t
τ=1wτ . Formally, starting from the
left, for each bit position i in st such that st(i) = 1, form strings sq = st(1) ◦ ... ◦ st(i − 1) ◦ 0 of length i. Let
s1, s2, ..., sQ be all such strings, where Q ≤ log T . For example, if st = 110 then the strings obtained this way
are: 0 and 10
14: Output: (Wˆt =
∑Q
q=1 Bˆsq ,B)
Proof. Let ∆ = Bs(D)−Bs(D′). Note that ‖∆‖2 ≤ R. Now, consider the following ratio:
pdf[Bˆs(D) = Θs]
pdf[Bˆs(D′) = Θs]
=
exp
||Θs−Bs(D)||22
2σ2
exp
||Θs−Bs(D′)||22
2σ2
= exp
||∆||22 − 2∆T (Bs(D′)−Θs)
2σ2
,
≤ exp R
2 + 2|∆T (Bs(D′)−Θs)|
2σ2
. (33)
Now, ∆T (Bs(D′)−Θs) follows N (0, ||∆||22σ2). For a random variable V ∼ N (0, 1), and for all γ > 1, pdf[|V | >
γ] ≤ e−γ2/2 ( Mill’s inequality ). Thus,
pdf[|∆T (Bs(D′)−Θs)| ≥ Rσγ] ≤ pdf[|∆T (Bs(D′)−Θs)| ≥ ||∆||2σγ] ≤ exp(−γ
2
2
)
Lemma follows by setting γ = 2
√
ln log Tδ in the equation above and combining it with (33).
Next, we provide formal privacy and utility guarantees for Algorithm 5. Our proof is inspired by a technique
developed by [13].
Theorem 9 (Algorithm 5: Privacy and Utility). Let D = 〈w1, · · · ,wT 〉 be a dataset of vectors with wt ∈ Rd being
provided online at each time step t. Let R = maxi≤T ||wi||2 and σ2 = R2ǫ log2 T log log Tδ . Let Wt =
∑t
τ=1wτ be
the partial sum of the entries in the dataset D till the t-th entry. Then, ∀t ∈ [T ], following are true for the output of
Algorithm 5 with parameters (t, ǫ, δ,R, T ).
• Privacy: The output Wˆt is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
• Utility: The output Wˆt has the following distribution: Wˆt ∼ N (Wt, kσ2Id), where k ≤ ⌈log T ⌉.
Proof. Utility: Note that Line 14 of the Algorithm 5 adds at most ⌈log T ⌉ vectors Bˆs (corresponding to the chosen
nodes of the binary tree B). Now each of the selected vectors Bˆs is generated by adding a noise bs ∼ N (0, σ2Id).
Furthermore, each bs is generated independent of other noise vectors. Hence, the total noise in the output partial sum
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Wˆt has the following distribution: N (0, kσ2Id), where k ≤ ⌈log T ⌉.
Privacy: First, we prove that Bˆ(D) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. As defined above, let D and D′ be the two
datasets (sequences of input vectors) that differ in exactly one entry. Let S ⊂ R2T−1. Now,
Pr[Bˆ(D) ∈ S]
Pr[Bˆ(D′) ∈ S] =
∫
Θ∈S pdf[Bˆ(D) = Θ]∫
Θ∈S pdf[Bˆ(D
′) = Θ]
.
Note that noise (bs) at each node s is generated independently of all the other nodes. Hence,
pdf[Bˆ(D) = Θ]
pdf[Bˆ(D′) = Θ]
=
Πs pdf[Bˆs(D) = Θs]
Πs pdf[Bˆs(D′) = Θs]
.
Since D and D′ differ in exactly one entry, B(D) and B(D′) can differ in at most log T nodes. Thus at most log T
ratios in the above product can be different from one. Now, by using Lemma 6 to bound each of these ratios and then
using composability argument [11, 10] over the log T nodes which have differing values in B(D) and B(D′),
Pr[Bˆ(D) = Θ] ≤ eǫ Pr[Bˆ(D′) ∈ Θ] + δ,
i.e., Bˆ(D) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Now, each partial sum is just a deterministic function of Bˆ(D). Hence, (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy of each partial
sum follows directly by (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy of Bˆ(D).
4 Discussion
4.1 Other Differentially Private Algorithms
Recall that in Section 3.3, we described our Private IGD algorithm that achieves O˜(
√
T ) regret for any sequence of
strongly convex, Lipschitz continuous functions. While, this class of functions is reasonably broad, we can further
drop the strong convexity condition as well, albeit with higher regret. To this end, we perturb each ft and apply IGD
over f˜t = ft+
α√
t
||x−x0||2, where x0 is randomly picked point from the convex set C. We can then show that under
this perturbation “trick” we can obtain sub-linear regret of O˜(T 3/4). The analysis is similar to our analysis for IGD
and requires a fairly straightforward modification of the regret analysis by [27].
We now briefly discuss our observations about the Exponentially Weighted Online Optimization (EWOO) [21],
another OCP algorithm with sub-linear regret bound. This algorithm does not directly fit into our Private OCP
framework, and is not wide-spread in practice due to relatively inefficient updates (see [21] for a detailed discussion).
However, just for completeness, we note that by using techniques similar to our Private OCP framework and using
exponential mechanism (see [30]), one can analyze this algorithm as well to guarantee differential privacy along with
O˜(
√
T ) regret.
4.2 Application to Offline Learning
In Section 3, we proposed a generic online learning framework that can be used to obtain differentially private online
learning algorithms with good regret bounds. Recently, [23] showed that online learning algorithms with good regret
bounds can be used to solve several offline learning problems as well. In this section, we exploit this connection to
provide a generic differentially private framework for a large class of offline learning problems as well.
In a related work, [3] also proposed a method to obtain differentially private algorithms for offline learning prob-
lems. However, as discussed later in the section, our method covers a wider range of learning problems, is more
practical and obtains better error bounds for the same level of privacy.
First, we describe the standard offline learning model that we use. In typical offline learning scenarios, one receives
(or observes) a set of training points sampled from some fixed distribution and also a loss function parametrized by
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Algorithm 6 Private Offline Learning (POL)
1: Input: Input dataset D = 〈z1, · · · ,zT 〉 and the convex set C
2: Parameter: Privacy parameters (ǫp, δ), generalization error parameter ǫg, Lipschitz bound L on the loss function
ℓ, bound on ‖x∗‖2
3: If C = Rd then set C = {x : x ∈ Rd, ‖x‖2 ≤ ‖x∗‖2}.
4: Choose x1 randomly from C
5: Set α← ǫg‖x∗‖22
6: Initialize s = x1
7: for t = 1 to T − 1 do
8: Learning rate: ηt = 1αt
9: IGD Update: xt+1 ← argminx∈C
(
1
2‖x− xt‖22 + ηt(ℓ(x;zt) + α2 ‖x‖22)
)
10: Store sum: s← s+ xt+1
11: end for
12: Average: x˜← sT
13: Noise Addition: x¯← x˜+ b, where b ∼ N (0d, β2Id) and β = 2
√
2(L+α‖x∗‖2) lnT
Tǫp
√
ln 1δ + ǫp
14: Output xˆ = argminx∈C
(‖x− x¯‖22)
some hidden parameters. Now, the goal is to learn the hidden parameters such that the expected loss over the same
distribution is minimized.
Formally, consider a domain Z and an arbitrary distribution DZ over Z from which training data is generated. Let
D = 〈z1, · · · ,zT 〉 be a training dataset, where each zi is drawn i.i.d. from the distribution DZ . Also, consider a loss
function ℓ : C × Z → R+, where C ⊆ Rd be a (potentially unbounded) convex set. Let ℓ(·; ·) be a convex function,
L-Lipschitz in both the parameters and let ℓ(0;z) ≤ 1,∀z ∈ Z . Intuitively, the loss function specifies goodness of a
learned model x ∈ C w.r.t. to the training data. Hence, the goal is to solve the following minimization problem (also
called Risk Minimization):
min
x∈C
Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x;z)]. (34)
Let x∗ be the optimal solution to (34), i.e., x∗ = argminx∈C Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x;z)].. Recently, [23] provided an algorithm
to obtain an additive approximation to (34) via online convex programming (OCP). The algorithm of [23] is as
follows: execute any reasonable OCP algorithm A (like IGD or GIGA ) on the function sequence F = 〈ℓ(x;z1) +
α
2 ‖x‖2, · · · , ℓ(x;zT ) + α2 ‖x‖2〉 in an online fashion. Furthermore, if the set C is an unbounded set, then it can be set
to be an L2 ball of radius ‖x∗‖2, i.e,
C = {x : x ∈ Rd, ‖x‖2 ≤ ‖x∗‖2}.
Now, let x1, · · · ,xT be the sequence of outputs produced by A. Then, output x˜ = 1T
∑T
t=1 xt as an approximation
for x∗. Theorem 11 bounds additional error incurred by x˜ in comparison to x∗. Next, to produce differentially private
output we can add appropriate noise to the output x˜. We present a detailed pseudo-code in Algorithm 6. For simplicity
of presentation, we instantiate our framework with the IGD algorithm as the underlying OCP algorithm.
First, we show that POL (Algorithm 6) is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Theorem 10 (POL Privacy). The Private Offline Learning (POL) algorithm (see Algorithm 6) is (ǫp, δ)-differentially
private.
Proof. Recall that to prove differential privacy, one needs to show that changing one training points from the dataset
D will not lead to significant changes in our algorithm’s output xˆ which is a perturbation of x˜ = 1T
∑T
t=1 xt. Hence,
we need to show that the L2-sensitivity (see Definition 3) of x˜ is low.
Now let x′1, · · · ,x′T be the sequence of outputs produced by the IGD algorithm used in Algorithm 6 when executed
on a dataset D′ which differs in exactly one entry from D. To estimate the sensitivity of x˜, we need to bound
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|| 1T
∑T
t=1(xt − x′t)||2. Now, using triangle inequality and Lemma 4, we get:
|| 1
T
T∑
t=1
(xt − x′t)||2 ≤
1
T
T∑
t=1
‖xt − x′t‖2 ≤
1
T
T∑
t=2
2L′
t− 1 ≤
2L lnT
T
, (35)
where L′ is the maximum Lipschitz continuity coefficient of ℓ(x,zt) + α2 ‖x‖22,∀t over the set C. Using the fact that
‖C‖2 = ‖x∗‖2, we obtain L′ = L+ α‖x∗‖2.
The theorem now follows using L2-sensitivity of x˜ (see (35)) and a proof similar to that of Lemma 1.
With the privacy guarantee in place, we now focus on the utility of Algorithm 6, i.e., approximation error for the
Risk Minimization problem (34). We first rewrite the approximation error incurred by x˜ = 1T
∑T
t=1 xt, as derived by
[23].
Theorem 11 (Approximation Error in Risk Minimization (Eq. 34) [23]). Let RA(T ) be the regret for the online
algorithm A. Then with probability at least 1− γ,
Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x˜; z)]− Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x∗; z)] ≤
α
2
‖x∗‖2 + RA(T )
T
+
4
T
√
L′2RA(T ) ln(4 lnTγ )
α
+
max{16L′2α , 6} ln(4 lnTγ )
T
where L′ = L + α‖x∗‖2, L is the Lipschitz continuity bound on the loss function ℓ and α is the strong convexity
parameter of the function sequence F .
Theorem 12 (POL Utility (Approximation Error in Eq. 34)). Let L is the Lipschitz bound on the loss function ℓ and T
be the total number of points in the training dataset D = {z1, . . . ,zT }. Let (ǫp, δ) be differential privacy parameters,
and d be the dimensionality. Then, with probability at least 1− γ,
Ez∼DZ [ℓ(xˆ; z)] −min
x∈C
Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x; z)] ≤ ǫg,
when the number of points sampled (T ) follows,
T ≥ Cmax


√
dL(L+ ǫg/‖x∗‖2)
√
ln 1γ ln
1
δ
ǫgǫp
,
(L+ ǫg/‖x∗‖2)2‖x∗‖22 lnT ln lnTγ
ǫ2g

 ,
where C > 0 is a global constant.
Proof. To prove the result, we upper bound Ez∼DZ [ℓ(xˆ; z)]− Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x∗; z)] as:
Ez∼DZ [ℓ(xˆ; z)] − Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x∗; z)] = Ez∼DZ [ℓ(xˆ; z)]− Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x˜; z)] + Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x˜; z)] − Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x∗; z)],
≤ L||xˆ− x˜||2 + Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x˜; z)− ℓ(x∗; z)],
= L||b||2 + Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x˜; z) − ℓ(x∗; z)], (36)
where the second inequality follows using Lipschitz continuity of ℓ and the last equality follows by the noise addition
step (Step 13) of Algorithm 6.
From the tail bound on the norm of Gaussian random vector, it follows that with probability at least 1− γ2 ,
||b||2 ≤ 3
√
dβ
√
ln
1
γ
≤ 12
√
dL′
lnT
Tǫp
√
ln
1
γ
ln
1
δ
, (37)
where L′ = L+ ǫg/‖x∗‖2, L is the Lipschitz continuity parameter of ℓ. Note that in Line 5 of Algorithm 6 we set the
strong convexity parameter α = ǫg||x∗||22 .
Now, regret bound of IGD is given by:
RIGD(T ) = O(ǫg +
L′
α
lnT ), (38)
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Thus, by combining (36), (37), (38), and Theorem 11, with probability at least 1− γ,
Ez∼DZ [ℓ(xˆ; z)]−min
x∈C
Ez∼DZ [ℓ(x; z)] ≤
ǫg
2
+C
√
dL(L+
ǫg
‖x∗‖2 ) lnT
√
ln 1γ ln
1
δ
ǫpT
+C
(L+
ǫg
‖x∗‖2 )
2‖x∗‖22 lnT ln lnTγ
ǫgT
,
where C > 0 is a global constant.
The result now follows by bounding the RHS above by ǫg.
We note that although our Algorithm 6 and analysis assumes that the underlying OCP algorithm is IGD, however
our algorithm and analysis can be easily adapted to use with any other OCP algorithm by plugging in the regret bound
and L2 sensitivity of the corresponding OCP algorithm.
Comparison to existing differential private offline learning methods: Recently, [3] proposed two differentially
private frameworks for a wide range of offline learning problems, namely, output perturbation and objective pertur-
bation. However, our method has three significant advantages over both the methods of [3]:
• Handles larger class of learning problems: Note that both privacy analysis (Theorem 10) and utility analysis
(Theorem 12) only require the loss function ℓ to be a convex, Lipschitz continuous function. In fact, the loss
function is not required to be even differentiable. Hence, our method can handle hinge loss, a popular loss
function used by Support Vector Machine (SVM). In comparison, [3] requires the loss function ℓ to be twice
differentiable and furthermore, the gradient should be Lipschitz continuous.
Furthermore, our method can be used for minimizing risk (see (34)) over any fixed convex constraint set C. In
contrast, [3] requires the set C to be the complete vector space Rd.
• Better error bound: Theorem 18 of [3] bounds the sample size by T = O(‖x∗‖22 ln
1
δ
ǫ2g
+ d‖x
∗‖2
ǫgǫp
), which is same
as our bound (see Theorem 12) except for an additional
√
d factor. Hence, our analysis provides tighter error
bound w.r.t. dimensionality of the space. We believe the difference is primarily due to our usage of Gaussian
noise instead of Gamma noise added by [3].
• More practical: Our method provides an explicit iterative method for solving (34) and hence provides differ-
ential privacy guarantees even if the algorithm stops at any step T . In contrast, [3] assumes optimal solution to
a certain optimization problem, and it is not clear how the differential privacy guarantees of [3] extends when
the optimization algorithm is forced to halt prematurely and hence might not give the optimal solution.
In a related work, [33] also proposed a differentially private framework for offline learning. However, [33] compares
the point-wise convergence of the obtained solution xˆ to the private optimum of true risk minimizer x∗, where as [3]
and our method (see Algorithm 6) compare the approximation error; hence, results of [33] are incomparable to our
results.
5 Empirical Results
In this section we study the privacy and utility (regret) trade-offs for two of our private OCP approaches under
different practical settings. Specifically, we consider the practically important problem of online linear regression
and online logistic regression. For online linear regression we apply our PQFTL approach (see Algorithm 4) and
for online logistic regression we apply our PIGD method (see Algorithm 2). For both the problems, we compare
our method against the offline optimal and the non-private online version and show the regret/accuracy trade-off with
privacy. We show that our methods learn a meaningful hypothesis (a hyperplane for both the problems) while privacy
is provably preserved due to our differential privacy guarantees.
5.1 Online Linear Regression (OLR)
Online linear regression (OLR) requires solving for xt at each step so that squared error in the prediction is minimized.
Specifically, we need to find xt in an online fashion such that
∑
t(yt − gTt xt)2 + α‖xt‖2 is minimized. OLR is a
practically important learning problem and have a variety of practical applications in domains such as finance [26].
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Figure 2: Privacy vs Regret. (a), (b): Average regret (normalized by the number of iterations) incurred by FTL and
PQFTL with different levels of privacy ǫ on the synthetic 10-dimensional data and Year Prediction Data. Note that
the regret is plotted on a log-scale. PQFTL obtained regret of the order of 1e − 2 even with high privacy level of
ǫ = 0.01. (c): Classification accuracy obtained by IGD and PIGD algorithm on Forest-covertype dataset. PIGD
learns a meaningful classifier while providing privacy guarantees, especially for low privacy levels, i.e., high ǫ.
Now, note that we can directly apply our PQFTL approach (see Section 3.5) to this problem to obtain differentially
private iterates xt with the regret guaranteed to be logarithmic. Here, we apply our PQFTL algorithm for the OLR
problem on a synthetic dataset as well as a benchmark real-world dataset, namely “Year Prediction” [15]. For the
synthetic dataset, we fix x∗, generate data points gt of dimensionality d = 10 by sampling a multivariate Gaussian
distribution and obtain the target yt = gTt x∗ + η, where η is random Gaussian noise with standard variance 0.01.
We generate T = 100, 000 such input points and targets. The Year Prediction dataset is 90-dimensional and contains
around 500, 000 data points. For both the datasets, we set α = 1 and at each step apply our PQFTL algorithm.
We measure the optimal offline solution using standard ridge regression and also compute regret obtained by the
non-private FTL algorithm.
Figure 2 (a) and (b) shows the average regret(i.e., regret normalized by the number of entries T ) incurred by
PQFTL for different privacy level ǫ on synthetic and Year Prediction data. Note that the y-axis is on the log-scale.
Clearly, our PQFTL algorithm obtains low-regret even for reasonable high privacy levels (ǫ = 0.01). Furthermore,
the regret gets closer to the regret obtained by the non-private algorithm as privacy requirements are made weaker.
5.2 Online Logistic Regression
Online logistic regression is a variant of the online linear regression where the cost function is logistic loss rather
than squared error. Logistic regression is a popular method to learn classifiers, and has been shown to be successful
for many practical problems. In this experiment, we apply our private IGDalgorithm to the online logistic regression
problem. To this end, we use the standard Forest cover-type dataset, a dataset with two classes, 54-dimensional feature
vectors and 581, 012 data points. We select 10% data points for testing purpose and run our Private IGD algorithm on
the remaining data points. Figure 2 (c) shows classification accuracy (averaged over 10 runs) obtained by IGD and
our PIGD algorithm for different privacy levels. Clearly, our algorithm is able to learn a reasonable classifier from
the dataset in a private manner. Note that our regret bound for PIGD method is O(
√
T ), hence, it would require more
data points to reduce regret to very small values, which is reflected by a drop in classification accuracy as ǫ decreases.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we considered the problem of differentially private online learning. We used online convex programming
(OCP) as the underlying online learning model and described a method to achieve sub-linear regret for the OCP
problem, while maintaining (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy of the data (input functions). Specifically, given an arbitrary
OCP algorithm, we showed how to produce a private version of the algorithm and proved the privacy guarantees by
bounding the sensitivity of the algorithm’s output at each step t. We considered two well known algorithms (IGD and
GIGA ) in our framework and provided a private version of each of the algorithm. Both of our differentially private
algorithms have O˜(
√
T ) regret while guaranteeing (ǫ, δ) differential privacy. We also showed that for the special
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case of quadratic cost functions, we can obtain logarithmic regret while providing differential privacy guarantees
on the input data. Finally, we showed that our differentially private online learning approach can be used to obtain
differentially private algorithms for a large class of convex offline learning problems as well. Our approach can handle
a larger class of offline problems and obtains better error bounds than the existing methods [3].
While we can provide logarithmic regret for the special class of quadratic functions, our regret for general strongly
convex functions is O˜(
√
T ). An open question is if the O˜(
√
T ) bound that we obtain is optimal or if it can be
further improved. Similarly, another important open question is to develop privacy preserving techniques for the OCP
problem that have a poly-logarithmic dependence on the dimension of the data. Finally, another interesting research
direction is an extension of our differentially private framework from the “full information” OCP setting to the bandit
setting.
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